當「愛國」成為武器，文革的幽靈還在嗎？

這幾年，生活在中國，一個非常明顯的感受是：告密和揭發的風氣正在回潮，而且愈演愈烈。從光鮮亮麗的當紅明星，到那些本來就處於社會邊緣的女權主義者、異議者，再到尋常百姓，甚至連自己的朋友圈都變得不再安全。這種景象，跟我們從歷史書上讀到、從長輩口中聽到，甚至是從書裡看到的「文化大革命」時期，那種「大義滅親」的紅衛兵文化，真的像得讓人心驚。

In recent years, one of the most striking feelings of living in China is the resurgence—and intensification—of the culture of informants and denunciation. From glamorous celebrities to marginalized feminists and dissidents, to ordinary citizens—even one’s own circle of friends is no longer safe. This eerily resembles what we’ve read in history books, heard from older generations, or seen in literature about the Cultural Revolution: the Red Guard mentality of “sacrificing even family for the greater cause.”

那個演員張哲瀚，就是因為幾年前參加了一個在日本靖國神社的日式婚禮，就被網友們翻舊賬，集體「扒皮」，最後被整個行業抵制。即便他出來道歉說自己「不親日，是中國人」，網友們還是不依不饒。還有台灣藝人小Ｓ，因為在東京奧運期間給台灣選手加油時用了「國手」這個詞，就被中國大陸網友圍攻，成了所謂的「台獨藝人」，丟了好幾個代言。這些事件，其實都是民族主義情緒在網絡上爆發的縮影。

Take actor Zhang Zhehan, for example. He attended a Japanese-style wedding at the Yasukuni Shrine a few years ago, and netizens dug it up, exposed him collectively, and ultimately got him blacklisted from the entire industry. Even after he apologized, stating, “I’m not pro-Japan; I’m Chinese,” the online attacks did not stop. Similarly, Taiwanese artist Dee Hsu was branded a “Taiwan independence supporter” and lost several endorsements just for cheering on Taiwanese athletes during the Tokyo Olympics, using the word “national team.” These incidents reflect how nationalist sentiments have erupted online.

但這不只是明星的事情，普通人也一樣。比如「雙減」政策剛出來那會兒，瀋陽有個家長，孩子補習考上高中了，轉頭就「實名舉報」了自己的物理老師。結果老師學費不僅要退回，還倒貼錢，最後被處分。你說這是為了什麼？ 有人覺得，這是政府長期以來進行「愛國訓練」的結果，加上近年來愈發嚴密和「高級」的審查制度，培養和鼓勵了新一代的民族主義者。在這種高壓的輿論環境下，「不愛國」成了一個特別好用的攻擊藉口，而表現得「狂熱愛國」呢，有時候也能撈到個人好處。

But it’s not just about celebrities—ordinary people are affected too. When the “double reduction” education policy was first introduced, a parent in Shenyang reported their child’s private tutor by real name after the child got into high school. The tutor not only had to refund the fees but also had to pay extra and was later punished. Why? Some argue it’s the result of years of “patriotic training” by the state, coupled with increasingly sophisticated censorship, which has fostered a new generation of nationalists. In this high-pressure environment, being labeled “unpatriotic” has become an effective weapon. At the same time, displaying “extreme patriotism” can sometimes bring personal gain.

我最近讀了馮客寫的那本《文化大革命：人民的歷史》，裡面有很多細節，讓我對當下這種告密風氣有了更深的理解。書裡寫到，文革時期，政治性的大字報、所謂的「文攻武斗」，還有那種無處不在的檢舉揭發，都是典型的手段。公安部長謝富治就曾經指示警察要「支持紅衛兵」，告訴他們「不要說他們打壞人是錯的。如果他們一怒之下打死了人，那就算了」。北京在 1966 年 8 月下旬，每天都有上百人被紅衛兵打死。學生們被號召到北京參加「革命」，雖然在有人看管的時候表現好，但沒人看管的時候，他們自己人之間也會互相攻擊，用拳頭和皮帶互毆，甚至有人被打到顱骨破裂。

I recently read The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History by Frank Dikötter. Many of its details helped me better understand today’s atmosphere of mutual surveillance and informant culture. The book describes how, during the Cultural Revolution, political wall posters, so-called “verbal and physical attacks,” and constant accusations were common tactics. Public Security Minister Xie Fuzhi once instructed police to “support the Red Guards” and told them, “Don’t say they’re wrong for beating up bad people. If they kill someone in a fit of rage, so be it.” In late August 1966 alone, over a hundred people per day were beaten to death by Red Guards in Beijing. Students summoned to join the “revolution” in the capital were sometimes well-behaved under supervision but would attack one another viciously when left alone—fighting with fists and belts, even causing skull fractures.

文革的時候，「清理階級隊伍」運動目標是揪出所謂混入黨內的間諜、叛徒，還有「兩面派」。他們會翻閱解放前的檔案，尋找隱藏的敵人、特務、與外國勢力有聯繫的人。書裡提到很多令人髮指的例子，比如河北有一個完全是虛構出來的「新國民黨」案，導致了幾百人被逼供、數百戶人家被抄家，七百多人被逼死，一千多人終身傷殘。湖南道縣發生的大屠殺，將近五千人因為出身不好——舊地主、富農、反革命分子的子女——而遭到屠殺，甚至連嬰兒都不放過。這種「煽動群眾鬥群眾」的做法，和現在網絡上那種有組織、有目標地攻擊所謂「不愛國」的人，原理上是相通的。毛澤東當時利用人民，但人民其實也在利用這個運動達到自己的目的。

During the “Cleansing of the Class Ranks” campaign, the goal was to root out so-called spies, traitors, and “two-faced people” within the Party. Authorities scoured pre-liberation archives, hunting for hidden enemies, agents, or people allegedly connected to foreign powers. One horrifying case involved a completely fabricated “New Kuomintang” conspiracy in Hebei Province, which led to hundreds being tortured, thousands of homes ransacked, more than 700 people driven to suicide, and over a thousand permanently disabled. In Dao County, Hunan, a mass slaughter took place: nearly 5,000 people were killed simply because they came from “bad class backgrounds”—descendants of landlords, rich peasants, and counter-revolutionaries. Even infants were not spared. The tactic of “inciting the masses to struggle against the masses” mirrors the targeted online campaigns today, where so-called “unpatriotic” individuals are publicly attacked. Mao used the people, and the people, in turn, used the movement to pursue their own ends.

那時候，整個社會都陷入了混亂。派系鬥爭讓很多城市變成了戰場。書裡提到，廣西在 1968 年夏天有八萬人被殺害，地方民兵和軍方聯手追殺所謂的「造反派」和「政治棄卒」。在柳江，有人被當眾斬首示眾。廣州甚至有人被砍頭、肢解後扔進水裡，屍體順著河流漂到香港和澳門。這不是單純的政治運動，是血淋淋的暴力和人性的扭曲。

The entire society descended into chaos. Factional conflicts turned many cities into battlegrounds. The book notes that in Guangxi during the summer of 1968, 80,000 people were killed. Local militias and the military teamed up to hunt down “rebels” and “political losers.” In Liujiang, people were publicly beheaded. In Guangzhou, some were decapitated, dismembered, and thrown into rivers—bodies floated all the way to Hong Kong and Macau. This wasn’t merely a political campaign; it was bloody violence and a brutal distortion of humanity.

為了備戰，全國搞「三線建設」，在內陸深山裡建工廠，投入了巨資，但經濟上卻是場災難，僅次於「大躍進」。農村搞「學大賽」，強行收回農民的自留地和牲口，搞集體化，結果適得其反。這一切都顯示出那種極權體制下，以政治狂熱來改造社會和經濟的荒謬與殘酷。

In preparation for war, China launched the “Third Front Movement,” building factories deep in inland mountains, pouring in massive funds, yet yielding economic disaster—second only to the Great Leap Forward. Rural areas implemented “Learn from Dazhai” programs, forcibly reclaiming private plots and livestock for collectivization, but the result was counterproductive. All this revealed the absurdity and cruelty of trying to reshape society and the economy through political fanaticism under totalitarian rule.

不過，雖然體制高壓到了極致，但人們的韌性也讓人驚訝。書裡提到，在文革後期，一種「第二社會」悄悄出現了。國家的計畫經濟一塌糊塗，商品短缺，農民為了活下去，偷偷開展地下經濟活動，搞黑市，種黑市裡賣得好的作物，甚至把公社的土地分給自家種。城市裡也是，禁書在地下流傳，手抄本、油印本偷偷傳閱。人們閱讀外國小說和批評共產主義體制的書，比如南斯拉夫的米洛凡 ﹒古拉斯寫的《新階級》，還有索忍尼辛的《伊凡 ﹒傑尼索維奇的一天》。這些都幫助讀者對共產革命產生批判性的觀點。即使是情色小說，在那個壓抑的環境裡，也賣到天價。這說明，即便在高壓統治下，人們依然會想辦法尋求自由和真實，這是一種民間自發的反抗和生存方式。

Yet despite the extreme pressure, people’s resilience was astonishing. In the later stages of the Cultural Revolution, a “second society” quietly emerged. The planned economy was failing, goods were in short supply, so farmers engaged in underground economic activities, sold on the black market, grew crops with good resale value, and even divided up communal land for private use. In cities, banned books were secretly circulated—hand-copied or mimeographed. People read foreign novels and critical works about communist regimes, like Milovan Djilas’s The New Class, or Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. Even erotic novels fetched sky-high prices in such a repressive environment. This shows that even under authoritarian rule, people still seek truth and freedom—a form of grassroots resistance and survival.

回頭看現在，網絡上的告密、人肉搜索、政治站隊，跟文革的手法多麼相似。雖然程度和形式不同，但核心都是利用某種政治正確（現在是「愛國」和民族主義）來打壓異己。有專家就說了，中國缺乏有效的法律來保障言論自由，這就讓網民可以選擇性地批鬥那些「政治不正確」的人，造成了空前的民粹主義。這在高漲的民族主義和緊張的國際形勢下，真的讓人非常擔憂，隨時可能「擦槍走火」。很多人都懷念以前大學裡那種「思想自由，兼容並包」的氣氛。也有人感嘆，沒想到中國會走到這一步。

Looking at today’s online culture of reporting, doxing, and political polarization, the parallels with the Cultural Revolution are stark. The degree and form may differ, but the essence is the same: using a form of political correctness—today, “patriotism” and nationalism—to suppress dissent. Experts have pointed out that China lacks effective legal protections for freedom of speech, allowing netizens to selectively attack those deemed “politically incorrect,” fueling an unprecedented populism. In the current climate of surging nationalism and rising international tension, this trend is truly alarming and ripe for misfire. Many now miss the university atmosphere of “freedom of thought and inclusivity.” Some lament that they never imagined China would reach this point.

《文化大革命》這本書讓我看到，那段歷史的傷痕有多深，那種對人性的摧殘有多可怕。而現在這種告密文化的死灰復燃，就像是文革的幽靈還在遊蕩。我們不能忘記過去的教訓，不能讓那種互相猜忌、互相傷害的模式再次主導我們的社會。捍衛每一個人的言論自由，拒絕成為告密的幫兇，用批判的眼光看待那些被操縱的民族主義情緒，這太重要了。因為一旦「愛國」成為可以隨意攻擊他人的武器，我們每個人都可能成為下一個受害者。鄧小平雖然在文革後選擇性地追究了少數人（比如審判「四人幫」），但為了避免大規模的清洗和動搖黨的統治，很多參與過文革的人並沒有被追責。他也一直試圖和文革保持距離。但 1989 年 6 月的事件表明，當國家認為自己的統治受到威脅時，仍然會毫不猶豫地使用暴力來壓制不同的聲音。這種「一黨專政不可違抗」的訊息，直到今天依然無所不在。這就是為什麼，警惕文革幽靈的回歸，追求真正的民主和自由，對我們來說，從來就不是一個抽象的口號，而是關乎每個人命運的現實。

The Cultural Revolution shows just how deep the scars of that era run, and how terrifying the destruction of humanity can be. Today’s revival of a culture of denunciation feels like the ghost of the Cultural Revolution still haunts us. We must not forget the lessons of the past. We cannot allow mutual suspicion and betrayal to dominate our society again. It’s vital to defend every individual’s freedom of expression, to refuse to become an accomplice to informant culture, and to view manipulated nationalist sentiment with a critical eye. Because once “patriotism” becomes a weapon used to attack others at will, any one of us could be the next victim. Although Deng Xiaoping selectively held a few people accountable after the Cultural Revolution—like the trial of the Gang of Four—he avoided a broad purge to maintain Party rule. Many perpetrators from that time were never held responsible. He tried to distance himself from the Cultural Revolution, but the events of June 1989 showed that when the state feels its rule is threatened, it will not hesitate to use violence to silence dissent. The message that “one-party rule must not be challenged” remains ever-present. This is why being vigilant about the return of Cultural Revolution-like practices and pursuing true democracy and freedom has never been just an abstract slogan—it’s a reality that concerns every one of us.