獨裁者聯盟
過去，曾經以為獨裁國家不過是幾個壞人控制軍隊與警察，透過暴力威嚇人民。但進入二十一世紀，現實情況已經完全不同了。當今的獨裁政權不再是單一惡人掌控，而是由一個個精密的網絡控制。這些網絡仰賴用於竊國的金融架構、複雜的維安體系，以及提供偵察監控、政治宣傳、不實資訊的技術專家。令人憂慮的是，這些統治網絡不只是在國內運作，也與其他獨裁國家的網絡往來，甚至與民主國家的成員互通聲息。
In the past, authoritarian regimes were often seen as a handful of bad actors controlling the military and police, using violence to intimidate the people. But in the 21st century, this perception no longer matches reality. Modern authoritarian regimes are not governed by a single villain, but by intricate networks of control. These networks rely on financial structures designed for state capture, sophisticated security systems, and technical experts providing surveillance, propaganda, and disinformation. Alarmingly, these regimes don’t operate in isolation—they interact with the networks of other dictatorships and even with actors in democratic countries.
也许這就是「獨裁者聯盟」的面貌。他們有共同的經濟利益，尤其都擁有緊抓權力不放的堅決意志。他們深知，透明度、問責制、正義、民主等概念對人民有吸引力，為了保住權位，就必須醜化這些概念，無論它們在哪裡出現。
This may well be the true face of a “league of autocrats.” They share economic interests and a firm commitment to retaining power at all costs. They understand that concepts like transparency, accountability, justice, and democracy are attractive to the public. To protect their rule, they must discredit these values, wherever they appear.
在這個聯盟的運作中，資訊戰與輿論控制是其核心武器之一。他們利用現代數位技術和虛假訊息來壓制國內異議，同時塑造有利於自身敘事的國際輿論。俄羅斯的 RT 和中國的 CGTN 等國際媒體，積極地為專制政權塑造合法性，並放大民主國家的內部問題，以破壞國際社會對民主價值的信任。中國國營媒體積極向非洲、拉美等地擴張，以低廉的價格提供內容，影響當地民眾對中國的看法。這些媒體相互合作，更直接與政府合作。在中國，宣傳、審查、外交和媒體被視為同一套運作的不同環節。他們會利用空殼公司來「洗」資訊產地，目的是傳播與國內一致的敘事，將民主描繪成衰落和混亂，醜化民主制度本身。
One of the core weapons of this alliance is the information war and control over public opinion. They use modern digital technologies and disinformation to suppress domestic dissent while shaping international narratives in their favor. Russian state media like RT and Chinese outlets such as CGTN actively work to legitimize authoritarian regimes and amplify internal issues in democratic countries, undermining global confidence in democratic values. Chinese state media are expanding aggressively in Africa and Latin America, offering cheap content to shape public perception of China. These outlets collaborate closely with each other and with their governments. In China, propaganda, censorship, diplomacy, and media are all treated as components of the same system. Shell companies are used to launder the origin of information, spreading narratives consistent with domestic propaganda—portraying democracy as chaotic and in decline, and vilifying democratic systems themselves.
資訊戰例子無處不在。例如，在 2022 年 2 月 24 日俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭後，關於烏克蘭有「美國資助的祕密生物實驗室」的荒謬傳聞隨即在網路上瘋傳。俄羅斯國防部和外交部發言人都嚴正宣稱此事，中國外交部發言人也呼應了俄方的說法。這些假消息來源相互配合，創造了一個國際級的回音室。即使是「新聞在場」這樣聲稱「獨立」的機構，或註冊在倫敦但實際總部在敘利亞的「雅拉新聞」，都在散播俄羅斯的假消息。這些操作的邏輯正在被聯盟的其他成員學習和複製。
Examples of this information warfare are everywhere. After Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, absurd rumors about “US-funded secret biolabs” in Ukraine quickly spread online. Russian Defense and Foreign Ministry spokespeople publicly promoted the story, and Chinese officials echoed their claims. These false narratives supported each other, creating a global echo chamber. Even seemingly “independent” organizations, such as “News Front” or “Yara News” (registered in London but based in Syria), helped spread Russian disinformation. This model is now being studied and replicated by other members of the authoritarian alliance.
除了資訊控制，跨國鎮壓是獨裁者聯盟用來維護自身的方式。他們將打壓異見的機制延伸到民主世界。目的是消滅、威嚇或壓制流亡的異議人士。這些人在國外可能透過網路發揮影響力，成為希望的象徵。攻擊他們的主要手段之一就是公開抹黑，指控他們腐敗，將他們描繪成「外國代理人」。例如，辛巴威當局攻擊牧師馬瓦里勒，指控他接受西方政府資助，並誣衊他涉嫌財務詐欺。這些指控即使荒謬，也能轉移公眾對執政黨腐敗的注意力，並加深人們的憤世嫉俗感，認為所有政治人物都一樣，應對政治敬而遠之。在網路上發起大規模的群眾式攻擊是當代抹黑運動的新形式。委內瑞拉政府會發放小額報酬給轉發政府宣傳的人。沙烏地阿拉伯則動用「蒼蠅大軍」攻擊政敵。這種國家指揮的網路霸凌，能讓異議人士「社會性死亡」，難以過有意義的人生。
Beyond information control, transnational repression is another tool these regimes use to maintain power. They extend their mechanisms of dissent suppression into democratic countries, aiming to silence, intimidate, or neutralize exiled dissidents. These individuals often have symbolic influence online and represent hope for others. One of the main methods of attack is public defamation—accusing them of corruption or branding them as “foreign agents.” For instance, Zimbabwean authorities smeared Pastor Evan Mawarire by claiming he received Western funding and was involved in financial fraud. Even if the accusations are absurd, they distract from the ruling party’s corruption and increase public cynicism, fostering the belief that all politicians are the same and that politics should be avoided. Coordinated online mob attacks are the new form of smear campaigns. In Venezuela, the government pays small sums to citizens who repost pro-regime content. Saudi Arabia deploys “troll armies” to harass critics. This state-led cyberbullying can cause “social death,” making it impossible for dissenters to live meaningful lives.
這種聯盟的模式也體現在經濟和安全領域。貪腐的國營企業會跨國做生意。一國的警察會為他國提供訓練和裝備。俄羅斯的華格納集團則向中非共和國等國提供「政權生存套裝方案」，包括保護領導人、鎮壓反對派、提供宣傳和洗錢渠道。這種服務的回報是礦產特許權和免稅出口權。這不僅鞏固了獨裁政權，也切斷了這些國家與民主盟友的關係。
This alliance’s pattern is also evident in economic and security spheres. Corrupt state-owned enterprises engage in international business. One country’s police force might train and equip another’s. Russia’s Wagner Group offers “survival packages” to regimes in countries like the Central African Republic—services that include leader protection, opposition suppression, propaganda, and money laundering channels. In return, they receive mineral concessions and tax-free export rights. This not only entrenches authoritarian rule but also severs these countries’ ties to democratic allies.
長期以來，民主國家與這些獨裁政權的經濟往來，並沒有像一些人樂觀預期地那樣帶來民主化。例如，西德與蘇聯的天然氣管建設，原本被認為能帶來可預測的政治關係，但最終卻被俄羅斯當作勒索工具。民主世界在礦產、半導體或能源供應上對獨裁國家的依賴，不僅是經濟風險，也在腐蝕我們的社會。獨裁國家的寡頭利用英美等地的金融和房地產市場洗錢，讓當地市場畸形，甚至導致政治人物腐敗。
For decades, economic engagement with authoritarian regimes by democratic nations did not lead to the democratization that some optimistically expected. For example, West Germany’s natural gas pipeline projects with the Soviet Union were originally thought to stabilize relations, but were ultimately used by Russia as leverage. The democratic world’s dependency on authoritarian regimes for minerals, semiconductors, or energy poses not just economic risks but social corrosion. Oligarchs from authoritarian states launder money through financial and real estate markets in the UK and US, distorting local economies and even corrupting political figures.
面對這一切，光是認識到威脅還不夠。我認為，民主國家必須團結一致，有效反擊這個獨裁者聯盟。我們需要建立網絡，追蹤並阻止跨國的盜賊統治，讓協助非法行為的中介機構承擔責任。我們需要改變資訊體系的規則，讓民眾對自己的數據和看到的內容有更多控制權。民主國家需要合作，讓可靠的媒體取代那些被專制政權操控的喉舌。這不僅是爭奪資訊主導權，更是一場關於價值觀的競爭。
Recognizing the threat is not enough. I believe democratic countries must stand united and respond effectively to this authoritarian alliance. We need to build networks to track and stop transnational kleptocracy, and hold enablers of illegal activity accountable. We must reform our information systems so that people have more control over their data and what content they see. Democracies must cooperate to amplify trustworthy media, pushing back against authoritarian propaganda machines. This is not just a fight for narrative control—it’s a contest over values.
這是一場持久戰，沒有人可以置身事外。民主世界必須意識到，我們的民主體制並非穩固不變。生活在其中的我們必須努力，才能守護自由、民主與人權的光亮。這意味著我們必須放棄對過去的幻想，認清我們所處的世界，並採取積極行動。
This is a long-term battle, and no one is exempt. The democratic world must realize that our systems are not indestructible. Those of us living in them must work actively to safeguard the light of freedom, democracy, and human rights. That means letting go of outdated illusions, facing reality, and taking bold, concrete action.