在極端民族主義下的表態

近年來中國社會瀰漫著一股日益強烈的民族主義氛圍。這股情緒不僅體現在官方宣傳中,更深入影響著民間輿論場,尤其是透過社群媒體放大。在這樣的環境下,對於一些被官方視為敏感或「反華」的國際議題,如香港民主運動、臺灣主權,或是俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭等,任何與官方口徑不一致的表態,都可能面臨來自政府和民間的嚴峻風險。

In recent years, an increasingly strong atmosphere of nationalism has spread throughout Chinese society. This sentiment is not only evident in official propaganda but also profoundly affects public opinion, particularly as it is amplified through social media. In this context, any expression that diverges from the official narrative on certain international issues considered sensitive or “anti-China” by the authorities—such as the Hong Kong democracy movement, Taiwan’s sovereignty, or Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—can face significant risks from both the government and the public.

首先,官方正在尋求法律手段來進一步控制言論和行為。曾經打算要修訂的《治安管理處罰法》草案中,有一項引起廣泛爭議的條款,規定在公共場所穿著、佩戴有損中華民族精神或傷害中華民族感情的服飾、標誌,或製作、傳播、宣揚、散佈有損民族精神、傷害民族感情的物品或言論者,可能面臨最高 15 日拘留及 5,000 元人民幣的罰款。這項條款最令人擔憂的是其定義極為模糊,並未具體說明何謂「傷害中華民族感情」或「有損中華民族精神」。法律專家和網民普遍質疑,這可能成為一個新的「口袋罪」,讓執法人員可以憑藉個人理解來認定和懲處行為。清華大學刑法學教授勞東燕便指出,模糊的處罰標準勢必導致行政權力的選擇性執法,容易造成權力濫用。換句話說,即使你沒有惡意,一件衣服沒穿好,一句話沒說對,理論上都可能被認為「傷害民族感情」而遭到拘留或罰款。這種模糊的定義空間,將使個人自由面臨嚴峻的干預,並可能助長民粹主義和極端民族主義情緒的蔓延。

Firstly, the authorities are seeking legal means to further control speech and behavior. In the draft of the “Public Security Administration Punishment Law,” which was once proposed for revision, there is a highly controversial provision stating that individuals who wear or display clothing or symbols that harm the spirit of the Chinese nation or hurt the feelings of the Chinese people in public places, or who produce, disseminate, promote, or spread materials or speech that harm national spirit or hurt national feelings, may face up to 15 days of detention and a fine of 5,000 yuan. The most concerning aspect of this provision is its extremely vague definition, which fails to clarify what constitutes “hurting the feelings of the Chinese people” or “harming the spirit of the Chinese nation.” Legal experts and netizens widely express concern that this could become a new “pocket crime,” allowing law enforcement to interpret and punish behaviors based on personal understanding. Professor Lao Dongyan from Tsinghua University’s Criminal Law Department pointed out that vague punishment standards will inevitably lead to selective enforcement of laws by administrative authorities, making it easy for power to be abused. In other words, even if there is no malicious intent, wearing a piece of clothing improperly or saying something incorrectly could theoretically be deemed as “hurting national feelings,” leading to detention or fines. This ambiguous definition will severely infringe on individual freedoms and may contribute to the rise of populism and extreme nationalist sentiments.

這種「傷害民族感情」的指控並非空穴來風。過去已有不少事件,例如有女子因穿著和服在日式風情街拍照,被警方以「尋釁滋事」罪名帶走,並被指控是「煽動民族仇恨」、「傷害民族感情」。即便後來警方歸還了和服,但並沒有道歉。如果新的法律草案通過,像這樣的事件將更有可能被認定為違法行為。這種對個人日常穿著的直接干預,顯然有過度之嫌。

The accusation of “harming national sentiment” is not without basis. There have been several incidents in the past, such as a woman being taken away by the police for wearing a kimono while taking photos in a Japanese-themed street, charged with “creating a disturbance,” and accused of “inciting national hatred” and “harming national sentiment.” Although the police later returned the kimono, they did not issue an apology. If the new draft law is enacted, incidents like this are more likely to be classified as illegal. This kind of direct interference in people’s daily attire is clearly excessive.

除了法律上的風險,來自民間極端民族主義情緒的反彈,也是不容忽視的危險源。官方透過教育和宣傳長年培養民族主義情緒,並將美國、日本等西方國家描繪成阻礙中華民族復興的「敵人」或「敵對勢力」。尤其在社群媒體上,愛國和民族主義情緒被自媒體和平台商業化利用,透過極端的排外言論來獲取流量和利潤,形成一種「愛國流量生意」。這種情況下,許多針對特定國家(尤其是日本)的謠言和仇恨言論充斥網絡,演變成「辱罵、嘲諷和散佈仇恨」的溫床。例如,有人會在短影音中對日本使用歧視性稱呼或將其描繪成敵人。

Besides the legal risks, the backlash from extreme nationalist sentiments in civil society is also a significant danger that cannot be overlooked. The government has long fostered nationalist feelings through education and propaganda, depicting Western countries like the United States and Japan as “enemies” or “hostile forces” that obstruct the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Particularly on social media, patriotic and nationalist sentiments are exploited by self-media and platforms, using extreme exclusionary rhetoric to attract traffic and generate profit, creating a “patriotic traffic business.” In this context, numerous rumors and hate speech directed at specific countries (especially Japan) permeate the internet, turning into a breeding ground for “abuse, mockery, and the dissemination of hatred.” For instance, some individuals use derogatory terms for Japan in short videos or portray it as an enemy.

這種網絡上的極端情緒,有時甚至會轉化為現實世界的暴力行為。近期發生的一些針對外國人的襲擊事件,例如美國教師在吉林遇襲和日本學童在蘇州、深圳遇襲,就被認為與網絡上的極端民族主義言論脫不了干係。這些襲擊事件的嫌疑人可能就受到了網絡仇恨言論的影響。儘管官方將這些事件稱為「偶發」,但實際上,它們與長期以來被允許甚至鼓勵的民族主義氛圍有著顯著關聯。

This kind of extreme sentiment online can sometimes manifest as violent acts in the real world. Recent attacks on foreigners, such as the assault on an American teacher in Jilin and the attacks on Japanese schoolchildren in Suzhou and Shenzhen, are thought to be closely linked to extreme nationalist rhetoric found online. The suspects in these incidents may have been influenced by online hate speech. While officials have described these events as “isolated,” they are actually significantly connected to a long-standing atmosphere of nationalism that has been tolerated and even encouraged.

在這樣的背景下,支持香港、臺灣、烏克蘭等被官方敏感化的議題,無異於挑戰這股強大的民族主義浪潮。

In this context, supporting issues like Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Ukraine—topics deemed sensitive by the authorities—amounts to a challenge against this powerful wave of nationalism.

  • 支持香港: 香港的民主運動被官方定性為「港獨暴徒」煽動的騷亂。任何聲援香港抗爭者的言論,都可能被極端民族主義者(常被稱為「小粉紅」)視為「漢奸」、「賣國賊」而遭到網絡圍攻,包括人身攻擊和死亡威脅。這不僅僅是零散的個人行為,部分「小粉紅」的行動被認為受到國家主導和官方支持。
    Support for Hong Kong: The democracy movement in Hong Kong has been labeled by the authorities as a “riot incited by Hong Kong independence extremists.” Any expression of support for Hong Kong protesters can be perceived by extreme nationalists (commonly known as “Little Pink”) as being “traitors” or “national betrayers,” resulting in online harassment, including personal attacks and death threats. This phenomenon is not just a series of isolated actions; some of the activities by “Little Pink” are thought to be orchestrated and supported by the state.
  • 支持臺灣: 臺灣問題在官方敘事中是「中國內政」,且與歷史上的「民族屈辱」緊密相連。官方將俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭的行為描述為「退無可退」的被迫之舉,藉此暗示如果未來武力統一臺灣,也將是情勢所迫,是「打得一拳開,免得百拳來」,以爭取民眾支持。支持臺灣主權或民主,顯然與這種官方論述及民族主義立場相悖,容易被視為分裂國家、傷害民族感情的「敵人」。曾在蘇黎世發動襲擊的兇手,此前就曾對臺灣主權的討論表達強烈憤怒。
    Supporting Taiwan: In the official narrative, the Taiwan issue is framed as “China’s internal affair” and closely tied to the historical “national humiliation.” The government portrays Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a forced move with “no way out,” suggesting that any future use of force to unify Taiwan would also be out of necessity—a “strike one punch to avoid a hundred punches”—to rally public support. Supporting Taiwan’s sovereignty or democracy obviously contradicts this official narrative and nationalist stance, and is often seen as being an “enemy” that divides the country and hurts national pride. The attacker who carried out the assault in Zurich had previously expressed strong anger over discussions about Taiwan’s sovereignty.
  • 支持烏克蘭: 在俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭後,中國官方媒體和教育體系系統性地將俄羅斯的行為「正當化」,強調是美國和北約將俄羅斯「逼到絕路」,並將烏克蘭總統描述為「充當美國棋子」的悲慘下場。教師們在集體備課活動中被要求統一口徑,引導學生接受這種觀點。在這種官方主導的敘事下,公開表達對烏克蘭的同情或批評俄羅斯的侵略,就等於質疑官方立場,可能會被視為受到西方影響或「負能量」的表現。曾有中國高校師生發起反戰連署,結果面臨阻撓,部分聯署者被警方約談警告。
    Support for Ukraine: Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chinese state media and the education system systematically “justified” Russia’s actions, claiming that the United States and NATO “forced Russia into a corner,” and portrayed the Ukrainian president as a tragic figure “acting as a pawn for the United States.” Teachers were instructed to present a unified stance during collective lesson planning, guiding students to accept this perspective. In this official narrative, openly expressing sympathy for Ukraine or criticizing Russia’s aggression is seen as questioning the official position and may be interpreted as being influenced by the West or as a display of “negative energy.” There have been cases where faculty and students at Chinese universities initiated anti-war petitions, only to encounter resistance, with some signatories being summoned and warned by the police.

生活在這樣的環境下,人們不僅要應對政府無處不在的監控和審查,提防被指控觸犯法律或模糊的「傷害民族感情」條款,還要承受來自民族主義網民的網絡暴力和人身攻擊。更令人不安的是,這種情緒煽動出的仇恨,有轉化為現實危險的可能性。儘管中共在某些時刻也會試圖為極端言論「降溫」,以維護國際形象和經濟利益(例如在針對外國人的襲擊事件後,官方平台發佈公告清理煽動仇恨內容),但由於這股力量已被長期利用,且與商業利益糾纏,要完全控制其負面影響極為困難。這就形成了一種「奧威爾式」的世界,政府與民眾都處於一種互相鉗制、互相擔憂的恐懼之中。

Living in such an environment, people must not only deal with the government’s pervasive surveillance and censorship, but also be wary of accusations of breaking laws or vague clauses about “harming national sentiment.” Additionally, they have to endure online violence and personal attacks from nationalist netizens. Even more troubling is the potential for the hatred stirred up by this sentiment to manifest as real danger. While the CCP may occasionally try to “cool down” extreme rhetoric to protect its international image and economic interests (for instance, after attacks on foreigners, official platforms may issue announcements to remove hate-inciting content), completely controlling its negative effects is extremely challenging due to the long-term exploitation of this force and its intertwining with commercial interests. This results in an “Orwellian” world where both the government and the public are caught in a cycle of mutual restraint and fear.

在中國,對這些敏感國際議題發出與官方不同的聲音,需要勇氣,更需要面對法律制裁、人身安全受威脅等多重風險。這片輿論場,對於獨立思考和表達異見的人來說,可謂步步驚心。

In China, expressing opinions on these sensitive international issues that diverge from the official narrative requires courage, and even more so, it involves confronting multiple risks, including legal repercussions and threats to personal safety. This public discourse environment is truly fraught with danger for those who engage in independent thinking and dissenting views.