「超級大國」：恐懼、貧窮與隱藏的真相
大部分人對中國作為一個崛起中的強大、繁榮「超級大國」的固有印象。哈里 · 羅賓 ( Harry Rowan ) 在 2007 年的預測，認為到 2025 年，中國將會成為「自由國家」的一員。然而，現實顯然與此相悖。與此同時，南韓和台灣在經濟發展後都成功走向了民主。為什麼 哈里 · 羅賓 這樣的智者會預測失誤？ 根本原因在於人們未能或不願承認一個簡單的事實：中國共產主義就是共產主義。這點，讓它與南韓、台灣等走向民主的國家有了本質上的區別。
Most people have an inherent impression of China as a rising, powerful, and prosperous “superpower.” Harry Rowan predicted in 2007 that by 2025, China would become a member of the “free nations.” However, reality clearly contradicts this. Meanwhile, South Korea and Taiwan have successfully transitioned to democracy following their economic development. Why did a sage like Harry Rowan make such a misprediction? The root cause lies in people’s failure or unwillingness to acknowledge a simple fact: Chinese communism is communism. This fundamentally distinguishes it from countries like South Korea and Taiwan that have moved towards democracy.
許多人常談論中國在過去幾十年的巨大經濟轉變，例如 1985 年的 天津，與 2019 年相比，這座城市已變得完全不同，幾乎認不出來。他承認這是一場「轉變」，但關鍵在於這場轉變的「性質」，以及我們能看到和看不到的部分。
Many often discuss China’s tremendous economic transformation over the past few decades, such as Tianjin in 1985, which has become almost unrecognizable compared to 2019. He acknowledges this as a “transformation,” but the key lies in the “nature” of this transformation and the parts we can and cannot see.
強烈質疑官方宣稱「將數億人帶出貧困」的說法，其為「完全的宣傳」。 在 毛澤東 於 1976 年去世時，絕大多數中國人的平均生活水平甚至比 1949 年中共建政時還要低。經歷過造成數千萬人死亡的 人造大饑荒 ( Great Famine ) (1958-62) 和摧毀國家的 文化大革命 ( Cultural Revolution ) 後，人們生活在極度貧困中。
Strongly questioning the official claim of “lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty,” it is described as “pure propaganda.” When Mao Zedong died in 1976, the average living standards of most Chinese people were even lower than in 1949 when the Communist Party came to power. After experiencing the man-made Great Famine (1958-62), which caused tens of millions of deaths, and the destructive Cultural Revolution, people lived in extreme poverty.
並非是政權或政府將人民帶出貧困，而是人民自己做到了這一點。毛澤東 死後，黨的控制減弱，尤其是在 文化大革命 期間軍隊撤回營房後，農村的人們發現沒有人再監管他們。於是，他們開始經營地下工廠、開放黑市、互相交易、奪回集體工具，甚至在地方幹部的默許下瓜分土地。 鄧小平 後來的改革，特別是允許農村擁有一定程度的經濟自由，只是對這種已經存在的自發行為「蓋上官方印章」，目的是為了維護集體經濟的「骨幹」。到 1982 年 人民公社 瓦解時，數億農村人口已經靠自己擺脫了貧困。這對我們理解中國現狀是「絕對關鍵的一點」。
It was not the regime or government that lifted the people out of poverty, but the people themselves who achieved this. After Mao Zedong’s death, the party’s control weakened, especially after the military withdrew to barracks during the Cultural Revolution, and rural people found that no one was monitoring them anymore. Thus, they began operating underground factories, opening black markets, trading with each other, reclaiming collective tools, and even dividing land with the tacit approval of local officials. Deng Xiaoping’s later reforms, particularly allowing a certain degree of economic freedom in rural areas, merely “stamped official approval” on these already existing spontaneous actions, aimed at maintaining the “backbone” of the collective economy. By the time the People’s Communes disbanded in 1982, hundreds of millions of rural residents had already lifted themselves out of poverty. This is “absolutely key” to understanding the current situation in China.
進一步解釋，改革開放的真正目標，正如黨在憲法中寫明的「四項基本原則」所揭示的，是維護共產黨的壟斷權力並鞏固社會主義經濟。這四項原則——堅持 馬克思列寧主義毛澤東思想、堅持社會主義道路、堅持人民民主專政、堅持中國共產黨的領導——其實質歸結為兩點： 馬克思主義 ( Marxism ) 和 列寧主義 ( Leninism )，即維護共產黨的權力壟斷和維護社會主義經濟。
To further explain, the true goal of the reform and opening-up, as revealed by the party’s “Four Cardinal Principles” stated in the constitution, is to maintain the monopoly power of the Communist Party and consolidate the socialist economy. These four principles—upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, adhering to the socialist path, maintaining the people’s democratic dictatorship, and upholding the leadership of the Communist Party of China—essentially boil down to two points: Marxism and Leninism, which means maintaining the Communist Party’s power monopoly and safeguarding the socialist economy.
儘管有著 本地生產總值 ( GDP ) 增長的數據，自 1949 年以來的一個不變事實是，絕大多數的 本地生產總值 ( GDP ) 增長都進入了國家的金庫。普通民眾在 本地生產總值 ( GDP ) 中的佔比是現代世界歷史上最低的。「國家很富有，人民卻很貧窮」，甚至可以將這種現象比喻為「貧窮中的富廟」。
Despite the data showing local GDP growth, an unchanging fact since 1949 is that the vast majority of GDP growth has entered the state treasury. The share of ordinary people in GDP is the lowest in modern world history. “The state is wealthy, but the people are poor,” and this phenomenon can even be likened to a “rich temple in poverty.”
有別於將共產主義視為維持國家統一工具的模式（例如 鐵托 時期的 南斯拉夫 ），中國共產黨是「真信徒」。他們堅信存在一個被稱為資本主義陣營或帝國主義陣營的敵人。這種被敵人包圍的印象自 1949 年起就一直存在。這種意識形態驅使他們像布爾什維克繼承沙皇俄國疆界一樣，維護了 清朝 帝國的邊界，包括 西藏、新疆 的 維吾爾族 地區等，並透過強制手段來實現統一，例如統一的時區、統一的語言等。然而，這種從上而下透過壟斷權力（即 列寧主義 ）來維持秩序的嘗試，反而會造成巨大的混亂。
Unlike the model that views communism as a tool for maintaining national unity (such as in Tito’s Yugoslavia), the Chinese Communist Party is a “true believer.” They firmly believe in the existence of an enemy known as the capitalist camp or the imperialist camp. This impression of being surrounded by enemies has persisted since 1949. This ideology drives them to maintain the borders of the Qing Dynasty empire, including regions such as Tibet and the Uyghur areas of Xinjiang, much like the Bolsheviks inherited the borders of Tsarist Russia, and they achieve unity through coercive means, such as a unified time zone and a unified language. However, this top-down attempt to maintain order through monopolized power (i.e., Leninism) can lead to significant chaos.
更為核心的是，這個政權被根深蒂固的恐懼和偏執 ( paranoia ) 所驅動。這種恐懼首先是對自己人民的恐懼。從 毛澤東 「星星之火可以燎原」的警句被反轉（現在是黨害怕任何一個小火花引發「反革命」），到鎮壓香港的抗議活動，政權必須壓制任何微弱的異議。他以 2008 年北京奧運期間兩位七旬老婦因試圖行使請願權而被捕為例，說明了這種深入骨髓的恐懼。
At its core, this regime is driven by deep-seated fear and paranoia. This fear primarily stems from a fear of its own people. From the inversion of Mao Zedong’s saying “A single spark can start a prairie fire” (now the party fears any small spark could ignite “counter-revolution”), to the suppression of protests in Hong Kong, the regime must stifle any faint dissent. He cited the example of two elderly women in their seventies who were arrested during the 2008 Beijing Olympics for attempting to exercise their right to petition, illustrating this profound fear.
其次，是對資本主義陣營的恐懼。他們堅信西方正試圖滲透和顛覆他們的權力。這種想法是「完全的妄想」 ( completely delusional )。例如，他們認為 1989 年的事件、最近香港的抗議活動都是由資本主義國家在幕後組織和資助的。他們極度害怕由美國國務卿 杜勒斯 ( John Foster Dulles ) 提出的「 和平演變 」 ( peaceful evolution ) 策略——波蘭在 1989 年 6 月 4 日投票脫離共產主義正是他們最懼怕的場景。
Secondly, there is the fear of the capitalist camp. They are convinced that the West is trying to infiltrate and subvert their power. This idea is “completely delusional.” For example, they believe that the events of 1989 and the recent protests in Hong Kong were organized and funded by capitalist countries behind the scenes. They are extremely afraid of the “peaceful evolution” strategy proposed by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles—Poland voting to break away from communism on June 4, 1989, is precisely the scenario they fear the most.
關於 1989 年的 天安門事件，事件發生的背景是 1988 年夏季高達 48%-50% 的通貨膨脹，以及普遍存在的腐敗問題。當時，來自各行各業的人，包括沒有領到工資的農民和厭倦腐敗的城市居民，都在全國各地的城市舉行了示威。1989 年確實是中國本可以轉向某種民主形式的時刻。然而，黨選擇了維護自身的權力。在 1989 年 6 月 4 日，北京的政權派遣了 10 萬士兵和 200 輛坦克鎮壓了民眾，造成數千人死亡 (約 2600 至 3400 人)。參與鎮壓的黨內人士都記得 文化大革命 中被「整肅」的經歷，因此害怕給予普通民眾發言權。這場鎮壓傳達了一個明確的信號：不得質疑中國共產黨的權力壟斷。
Regarding the Tiananmen incident of 1989, the backdrop of the event was the inflation rate soaring to 48%-50% in the summer of 1988, along with widespread corruption. At that time, people from various walks of life, including farmers who had not received their wages and urban residents weary of corruption, held demonstrations in cities across the country. 1989 was indeed a moment when China could have shifted towards some form of democracy. However, the Party chose to maintain its own power. On June 4, 1989, the regime in Beijing dispatched 100,000 soldiers and 200 tanks to suppress the populace, resulting in thousands of deaths (approximately 2,600 to 3,400 people). Those within the Party who participated in the suppression recalled their experiences of being “purged” during the Cultural Revolution, thus fearing to grant ordinary citizens a voice. This crackdown sent a clear message: the monopoly of power by the Chinese Communist Party must not be questioned.
中國真正的經濟增長實際上是從加入 世貿組織 ( WTO ) (2001) 後才開始的。在此之前，中國在 2000 年的全球 本地生產總值 ( GDP ) 排行榜上的位置甚至比 1976 年還要靠後。他稱所謂的幾十年雙位數增長是「無稽之談」，到 2000 年時，中國的農村徹底破產，四大國有銀行深陷赤字，國有企業整體無法盈利，國家瀕臨徹底破產的邊緣。
China’s real economic growth actually began after joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Prior to that, China’s position in the global GDP rankings in 2000 was even lower than in 1976. He referred to the so-called decades of double-digit growth as “nonsense.” By 2000, China’s rural areas were completely bankrupt, the four major state-owned banks were deep in the red, state-owned enterprises were overall unprofitable, and the country was on the brink of total bankruptcy.
江澤民 在 1999 年 北約 誤炸中國駐南斯拉夫大使館後，在政治局常委會議上的發言。 江 說美國憎恨他們，必須建立軍隊，並必須加入 世貿組織，但「不要遵守他們的規則」。事實上，美國同意中國加入 世貿組織 是一個錯誤，並且美國本應更清楚這一點。這是因為中國領導人一再明確表示他們正在與資本主義作鬥爭並希望維持社會主義經濟。中國在知識產權保護、透明度、法治等方面屢次做出承諾，卻鮮有兌現。加入 世貿組織 讓中國得以輸出其大規模的過度生產 ( overproduction ) 問題，導致其他國家的企業難以競爭，最終不得不將工廠遷往中國。
Jiang Zemin’s remarks at a Politburo Standing Committee meeting after NATO mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999. Jiang stated that the United States hated them, that they must build an army, and that they must join the WTO, but “do not follow their rules.” In fact, the U.S. agreeing to China’s accession to the WTO was a mistake, and the U.S. should have been more aware of this. This is because Chinese leaders have repeatedly made it clear that they are fighting against capitalism and wish to maintain a socialist economy. China has made numerous commitments regarding intellectual property protection, transparency, and the rule of law, but has rarely fulfilled them. Joining the WTO allowed China to export its massive overproduction problem, making it difficult for businesses in other countries to compete, ultimately forcing them to relocate factories to China.
儘管 習近平 被認為是繼 毛澤東 以來最有權勢的領導人， 但他本質上與其前任沒有太大不同。 習近平 之所以能做到 江澤民 等人想做但做不到的事情，是因為他得益於中國加入 世貿組織 後累積的財富。這筆財富讓他能夠投入巨資建設龐大的監控體系 和軍隊，這是在他之前領導人無法企及的。
Although Xi Jinping is considered the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, he is essentially not much different from his predecessors. Xi’s ability to accomplish what Jiang Zemin and others wanted to do but could not is due to the wealth accumulated after China’s accession to the WTO. This wealth has enabled him to invest heavily in building a vast surveillance system and military, something that previous leaders could not achieve.
關於台灣， 攻擊台灣的意圖並非始於 習近平 ，而是早在他之前的每一位領導人就已經明確表達過的。他們都將台灣視為威脅，並且從未放棄使用武力。 一旦佔領台灣，出於同樣的恐懼和偏執，政權可能會繼續向外擴張，例如瞄準 關島 ( Guam ) 甚至 珍珠港 ( Pearl Harbor )，直到「資本主義陣營」消失。
Regarding Taiwan, the intention to attack Taiwan did not begin with Xi Jinping but has been clearly expressed by every leader before him. They have all viewed Taiwan as a threat and have never abandoned the use of force. Once Taiwan is occupied, driven by the same fears and paranoia, the regime may continue to expand outward, targeting places like Guam or even Pearl Harbor, until the “capitalist camp” disappears.
然而，儘管中國軍隊規模龐大， 但是其戰鬥能力值得懷疑。解放軍 ( PLA ) 在過去四分之三個世紀中鮮有實戰經驗（除了 1979 年對越南的自衛反擊戰，他稱之為「一場災難」，以及 1989 年鎮壓本國平民，他諷刺說「在對付手無寸鐵的平民方面，他們的表現確實更好了」）。 習近平 對軍隊的清洗 也使得其內部狀況和戰鬥意願成疑。有可能，連 習近平 自己也不知道軍隊的真實戰鬥力如何。
However, despite the large size of the Chinese military, its combat capability is questionable. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has had little real combat experience over the past three-quarters of a century, except for the 1979 self-defense counterattack against Vietnam, which he described as “a disaster,” and the 1989 suppression of domestic civilians, where he sarcastically noted that “they indeed performed better against unarmed civilians.” Xi Jinping’s purges of the military have also raised doubts about its internal conditions and combat willingness. It is possible that even Xi Jinping himself does not know the true combat strength of the military.
中國就像一艘「從遠處看著像模像樣的油輪，但在甲板下，水手們正在拼命地抽水和堵漏以讓船浮著」。儘管看起來強大，但其內部遠比表面上要弱。而且，中國人民已經「受夠了」，特別是經歷了嚴酷的武漢肺炎封鎖之後。人們舉行了抗議（例如舉白紙）。還有，人口正在老齡化和萎縮。
China resembles “a tanker that looks decent from a distance, but below deck, the sailors are desperately pumping water and plugging leaks to keep the ship afloat.” Despite appearing strong, its internal situation is much weaker than it seems. Moreover, the Chinese people have “had enough,” especially after enduring the harsh lockdowns due to the Wuhan pneumonia. Protests have erupted (such as holding blank sheets of paper). Additionally, the population is aging and shrinking.
有鑑於此， 建議全世界對中國採取類似冷戰時期的「圍堵」 ( containment ) 策略。中國政權已經將自己封閉起來。中國擁有一個與世界隔離的網絡，並非真正開放的國家。人員（外國人很少進入）、思想（資訊被封鎖）、資金（難以流出） 和商品（鼓勵出口）的流動都受到嚴格控制，如同「 加州旅館 」 ( Hotel California ) ——「你可以辦理入住，但無法離開」。因此，「圍堵他們，讓他們爛掉」 ( Let them rot ) 是不錯的策略。
In light of this, it is suggested that the world adopt a containment strategy similar to that of the Cold War towards China. The Chinese regime has isolated itself. China has a network that is cut off from the world and is not truly an open country. The flow of people (with few foreigners allowed in), ideas (information is blocked), capital (difficult to exit), and goods (exports are encouraged) is strictly controlled, akin to “Hotel California” — “you can check in, but you can never leave.” Therefore, “let them rot” is a reasonable strategy.
美國對中國的看法已發生巨大轉變，尤其是在武漢肺炎疫情之後。雖然中國是個「邪惡的帝國」 ( evil empire )，但它不是一個超級大國 ( superpower )。就像當年有些人誇大蘇聯經濟實力一樣，我們不應低估美國和其他民主國家的實力。儘管 習近平 充滿恐懼，需要不斷監控身邊的每個人，這消耗了他的大量精力，但政權這部機器仍在運轉。
The United States’ perception of China has undergone a significant shift, especially after the Wuhan pneumonia pandemic. While China is an “evil empire,” it is not a superpower. Just as some exaggerated the economic strength of the Soviet Union in the past, we should not underestimate the strength of the United States and other democratic countries. Despite Xi Jinping being filled with fear and needing to constantly monitor everyone around him, which consumes a lot of his energy, the machinery of the regime continues to operate.
總而言之， 我們需要認清一個與主流敘事截然不同的中國圖景：一個被恐懼和偏執所驅動、內部存在結構性弱點、經濟成就被誇大且依賴外部開放的政權。這個政權的強大更多體現在其嚴酷的控制和對外形象的經營上，而非真正的內在韌性或人民的支持。這是一個值得深思的觀點，挑戰了我們對這個日益自信的東方巨龍的傳統認知。
In summary, we need to recognize a picture of China that is entirely different from the mainstream narrative: a regime driven by fear and paranoia, with structural weaknesses internally, whose economic achievements are exaggerated and reliant on external openness. The strength of this regime is more reflected in its harsh control and management of its external image than in genuine internal resilience or popular support. This is a thought-provoking perspective that challenges our traditional understanding of this increasingly confident Eastern giant.