中國經濟，兩個世界：新三樣與 AI 救不了！

最近這段時間，我在觀察中國經濟時，感受到一種非常強烈的撕裂感。一個「中國」閃閃發光，那是官方媒體上描繪的景象：我們引以為傲的「新三樣」——電動汽車、鋰電池和太陽能電池，正被塑造成拉動經濟的新引擎，國產大語言模型 DeepSeek 的橫空出世，也讓許多人重拾了民族科技自信。

Lately, observing the Chinese economy, I’ve felt a profound sense of division. One “China” shines brightly, reflecting the image painted by official media: our proud “New Three Items”—electric vehicles, lithium batteries, and solar cells—are being touted as the new engines driving economic growth, and the emergence of the domestic large language model, DeepSeek, has restored much national technological confidence.

但另一個「中國」卻是黯淡蕭條。現實中，欠薪事件頻發、失業問題嚴重，年輕人找不到工作，社會保障不足，消費持續疲軟，地方債務危機更是加劇。人們不禁要問：科技突破和產業升級，為什麼沒有轉變成普通人的好日子？這所謂的「新質生產力」，究竟是經濟轉機，還是一種精英的幻覺？

But the other “China” is dim and desolate. In reality, wage arrears are frequent, unemployment is severe, young people can’t find jobs, social security is inadequate, consumption remains weak, and local debt crises are escalating. People can’t help but ask: Why haven’t technological breakthroughs and industrial upgrading translated into a better life for ordinary people? Is this so-called “new quality productive force” a turning point for the economy, or just an elite illusion?

其實，這兩個「中國」同時存在一點也不矛盾，它就像是局部和整體的關係。想想看，一個人如果吃興奮劑，可能在某次短跑中表現出色，但這絕不代表他整體身體健康。我們過去也見過類似的場景，高鐵、高速公路、房地產這些領域，都曾在一種刺激政策下突然大爆發，然後又隨之出現巨大的問題。現在這些「新三樣」和 AI 領域，雖然看起來技術含量更高，似乎與過去純粹的重複建設不同，但從最近的亂象和產能過剩來看，本質上似乎沒什麼兩樣。

Actually, the simultaneous existence of these two “Chinas” isn’t contradictory at all; it’s like the relationship between the local and the overall. Think about it: if someone takes stimulants, they might perform exceptionally well in a short sprint, but that definitely doesn’t mean their overall health is good. We’ve seen similar scenarios in the past, with high-speed rail, expressways, and real estate—all these sectors once experienced a sudden boom under certain stimulus policies, only to be followed by huge problems. Now, these “New Three Items” and AI sectors, although seemingly more technologically advanced and perhaps different from pure repetitive construction in the past, essentially appear no different given the recent chaos and overcapacity.

我一直覺得，理解中國經濟狀況最根本的特徵，就是「資源和資本錯配」。什麼是錯配呢？打個比方，就像你爸突然給你一大筆「非來橫財」，你多半會很不負責任地花掉，不是嗎？對地方政府和國有企業來說也一樣。當花錢的人花的不是自己的錢，又不需要為最終的利潤負責時，他們花錢當然手就鬆了。

I’ve always believed that the most fundamental characteristic for understanding the Chinese economy is the “misallocation of resources and capital”. What does misallocation mean? To put it simply, it’s like your dad suddenly gives you a large sum of “windfall money”; you’ll most likely spend it very irresponsibly, won’t you? It’s the same for local governments and state-owned enterprises. When the people spending the money aren’t spending their own, and don’t bear responsibility for the final profits or losses, they naturally spend lavishly.

問題就在於，中國的企業和政府實體，它們的根本激勵措施不是利潤。一個小老闆開自己的店，他會精打細算，把錢花在刀刃上，因為他要對自己的盈虧負責。但政府建高速公路，國企搞項目，他們追求的是當年的固定資產投資增速、GDP 數字和利稅。為了這些指標，錢就會花到完全錯誤的地方去，導致重複建設和大量無效投資。過去我們見過貴州的「水司樓」這樣的大基建項目，現在這種模式，只是轉移到了高科技領域。

The problem lies in the fact that the fundamental incentive for Chinese enterprises and government entities isn’t profit. A small business owner meticulously manages their money, spending it where it counts, because they are responsible for their own gains and losses. But governments building highways and state-owned enterprises undertaking projects are pursuing annual fixed asset investment growth, GDP figures, and tax revenues. To meet these targets, money gets spent in completely wrong places, leading to redundant construction and a lot of ineffective investment. In the past, we saw large infrastructure projects like Guizhou’s “Water Sishi Building,” and now this model has simply shifted to high-tech sectors.

而今天，「新三樣」這些領域，已經產能過剩到無以復加的地步了。以太陽能光伏為例，中國光伏的整體產能已經是全世界需求的 2.3 倍。為什麼會這樣？很大部分原因就是錯誤的激勵.。政府會給予擴產的企業配套資金，提供超出市場規律的低息銀行資本.。企業也普遍認為，只要我把產能擴大，成本就會攤薄，規模效應會讓我有競爭力。這話本身沒錯，但當所有企業都這麼想，而且都得到政府的鼓勵時，總產能加起來就是個天文數字，根本與市場需求不匹配。

Today, these “New Three Items” sectors are suffering from severe overcapacity. Take solar photovoltaics as an example: China’s total solar PV production capacity is already 2.3 times the global demand. Why is this happening? A big part of the reason is distorted incentives. The government provides matching funds to enterprises that expand production and offers extremely low-interest bank capital that defies market logic. Companies also widely believe that by expanding production, their costs will be diluted, and economies of scale will make them competitive. This isn’t wrong in itself, but when all companies think this way and are encouraged by the government, the combined production capacity becomes astronomical, completely unmatched by market demand.

而電動汽車投資過剩，在 2018 年中國有將近 500 家電動車企業，到了 2024 年大概只剩下 70 家。其中有一家叫奇點汽車，從投資人那裡籌集了 23 億美元，裡面包括三個省的地方政府的錢。這家公司存在了八年多，卻連一輛車都沒交付，然後在 2023 年申請破產了。我當時就想，這些地方政府是瘋了嗎？他們為什麼會把那麼多億美元的資金投給一個可能只拿著 PPT 或造出了一輛樣車的公司？

Excessive investment in electric vehicles has become. In 2018, there were nearly 500 EV companies in China; by 2024, there are only about 70 left. One such company, Singulato, raised 2.3 billion USD from investors, including local governments from three provinces. This company existed for over eight years without delivering a single vehicle, then filed for bankruptcy in 2023. I wondered at the time, were these local governments insane? Why would they invest billions of dollars in a company that perhaps only had a PPT or a single prototype car?

這背後，其實就是所謂的「合肥模式」在全國各地被盲目複製。合肥作為一個中部城市，曾因為投資科大訊飛、比亞迪、蔚來汽車等而成為中國城市產業政策的樣板，大家都覺得政府靠股權投資能成為新的財政增長點。但要知道，真正有眼光的項目是有限的，而且合肥能成功，可能與其軍工科工院校的資源、長三角製造業轉移的輻射有關。其他城市盲目複製，既沒資源也沒資金，絕大部分都無疾而終。現在看來，這些當初被吹捧的「理財模式」，基本都瞎折騰了。

Behind this is the blind replication of the so-called “Hefei Model” across the country. Hefei, as a central city, once became a model for China’s urban industrial policy due to its investments in iFlytek, BYD, and Nio, leading everyone to believe that government equity investment could be a new source of fiscal growth. However, truly visionary projects are limited, and Hefei’s success might be related to its military-industrial scientific research resources and the radiation effect of manufacturing relocation from the Yangtze River Delta. Other cities blindly replicating the model, lacking both resources and funds, mostly ended up with nothing. Now it seems these once-praised “wealth management models” have largely failed.

近期電動汽車行業發生的「大佬互撕」事件，更是把問題擺在了檯面上。吉利控股集團董事長李書福說，當今世界汽車工業存在嚴重產能過剩，吉利已決定不再建設新工廠或擴大現有產能。他還不點名地批評，有些企業的競爭「難以啟齒」，業界普遍認為這是在批評比亞迪。幾天前，長城汽車董事長魏建軍也拋出了「車圈恆大」論，警告汽車產業裡已經存在恆大，只是還未爆雷。他還痛批了「零公里二手車」翻爛的問題。比亞迪公關部門當然反駁了，說他們營運良好，指控是危言聳聽。

Recently, the “big boss infighting” in the EV industry further exposed the problems. Li Shufu, chairman of Geely Holding Group, stated that there is severe overcapacity in the global automotive industry today, and Geely has decided not to build new factories or expand existing capacity. He also implicitly criticized that the competition among some companies is “unmentionable,” which the industry widely believes to be directed at BYD. A few days prior, Wei Jianjun, chairman of Great Wall Motor, put forward the “Evergrande of the car industry” theory, warning that an Evergrande-level financial risk already exists in the automotive industry, but has not yet detonated. He also fiercely criticized problems like “zero-kilometer used cars” being dumped. BYD’s public relations department, of course, refuted these claims, stating that their operations are healthy and the accusations are alarmist.

但從數據看，這個行業的問題確實大到市關行業真實生存。電動車價格戰已經打了好幾年，但今年第一季度打得特別厲害。一方面是國家從去年 7 月開始的消費品「以舊換新」政策，電動車平均有 1 到 2 萬元的補貼，這對 10 萬元左右的車來說，根本就是打八折，給了車企更大的降價空間。今年第一季度，比亞迪有些車型甚至降價 30% 到 40%。這對全行業產生了恐怖的影響：新能源汽車行業的平均毛利率，從 15% 驟降到 9%。在這種價格戰下，很多品牌單車虧損都在加大。

However, the data shows that the industry’s problems are indeed large enough to threaten its very survival. The EV price war has been going on for years, but it intensified particularly in the first quarter of this year. On one hand, the national “trade-in” policy for consumer goods, starting last July, provided an average subsidy of 10,000 to 20,000 RMB for EVs. For a car priced around 100,000 RMB, this is essentially an 80% discount, giving car companies more room for price cuts. In the first quarter of this year, some BYD models even saw price drops of 30% to 40%. This had a terrifying impact on the entire industry: the average gross profit margin of the new energy vehicle industry plummeted from 15% to 9%. Under this price war, many brands are experiencing increasing per-vehicle losses.

比亞迪自身也受到很大影響。他們 2024 年第一季度的存貨金額，比 2023 年第一季度暴漲了 56.28%，達到 1543 億元。同時，經營活動現金流下降了 21%。這說明什麼？說明市場已經飽和，根本沒有那麼多市場來買他們這麼大庫存的車了。它的週轉天數也從過去的 20 天增加到最多 90 天。這種庫存急劇擴張、經營現金流降低、銷售期拉長的現象，聽起來是不是很像房地產在 2019 年、2020 年時的情景？

BYD itself has been significantly affected. Its inventory value in the first quarter of 2024 surged by 56.28% compared to the first quarter of 2023, reaching 154.3 billion RMB. At the same time, its cash flow from operating activities decreased by 21%. What does this indicate? It shows that the market is already saturated, and there simply isn’t enough demand to buy such a large inventory of their cars. Its inventory turnover days also increased from a previous 20 days to as long as 90 days. This rapid expansion of inventory, declining operating cash flow, and prolonged sales cycle, doesn’t it sound a lot like the situation in the real estate market in 2019 and 2020?

雖然我覺得電動車行業的破裂不會像房地產那樣劇烈。畢竟房地產是國家在「房住不炒」政策下主動刺破的，而新能源汽車關係到「新質生產力」的面子，政府還在不斷投入錢，發放「以舊換新」補貼，努力幫助他們去庫存。而且，對政府來說，這不也是將企業國有化或部分國有化的好機會嗎？

Though I believe the EV industry’s collapse won’t be as drastic as real estate’s. After all, real estate’s bubble was intentionally burst by the state under the “houses are for living in, not for speculation” policy, whereas new energy vehicles are linked to the “face” of “new quality productive forces.” The government continues to inject funds, providing “trade-in” subsidies, and actively helping them reduce inventory. Moreover, for the government, isn’t this also a good opportunity to nationalize or partially nationalize these enterprises?

再談科技創新。如果一個國家科技發達，風險投資（ VC ）行業應該很蓬勃，但中國的情況恰恰相反。中國 2024 年的全國 VC 投資量是近十年來的倒數第一，而美國 2024 年卻是近十年來的第三高點。這說明中國的創新模式與美國完全不同，我們完全靠大型企業內部研發創新，根本不靠 VC 和新創企業。華為、比亞迪、寧德時代這些「超級企業」是研發的主力。

Let’s talk about technological innovation. If a country’s technology is advanced, its Venture Capital ( VC ) industry should be thriving, but the situation in China is quite the opposite. China’s total VC investment in 2024 is the lowest in nearly a decade, while the US in 2024 is at its third-highest point in a decade. This indicates that China’s innovation model is completely different from the US; we rely entirely on internal R&D by large enterprises, not on VC and startups. “Super enterprises” like Huawei, BYD, and CATL are the main drivers of R&D.

就拿華為來說，它確實是一個典型代表。每年研發投入佔比 20% 以上，員工一半以上從事研發。它幾乎是 Apple 加 Ericsson 加 NVIDIA 加 BYD 加 OpenAI ，什麼都做。看似在很多領域都有成果，比如 GPU 搞出來了，鴻蒙操作系統也搞出來了。但我對華為的研發和創新一直有個特別扎心的問題：華為有沒有真的「很厲害」的研發能力？

Take Huawei, for instance, it’s certainly a typical example. Its annual R&D investment accounts for over 20% of its revenue, and more than half of its employees are engaged in R&D. It’s almost like Apple plus Ericsson plus NVIDIA plus BYD plus OpenAI; it does everything. It seems to have achieved results in many areas, like developing its own GPU and HarmonyOS operating system. But I’ve always had a particularly piercing question about Huawei’s R&D and innovation: does Huawei truly possess “very powerful” R&D capabilities?

很多時候，華為的科技研發，是大規模的「重複發明輪子」。比如晶片，OpenAI 不需要自己生產晶片，買 NVIDIA 的就好；Google 也不需要發明 Android ，直接用就好。但華為為了「國家安全」的考量，晶片得重新發明，操作系統得重新發明，雲計算也得自己重新發明。這些「重新發明輪子」的工作，對於國家安全當然非常重要，能做出來本身也是本事。但這與突破性創新有很大區別，畢竟是針對別人已有的技術路徑，自己再做出來。而且，華為的手機、折疊屏等產品，在國外市場的競爭力其實很一般，海外佔有率比小米還差很多。我特別懷疑這種超大型企業「六合一、七合一」的研發能力到底能好到哪裡去。

Often, Huawei’s technological R&D involves extensive “reinventing the wheel”. For example, for chips, OpenAI doesn’t need to produce its own chips; it just buys NVIDIA’s. Google doesn’t need to invent Android; it just uses it. But Huawei, due to “national security” considerations, has to reinvent chips, reinvent operating systems, and reinvent cloud computing itself. This “reinventing the wheel” work is undoubtedly very important for national security, and the ability to achieve it is commendable in itself. However, it differs significantly from breakthrough innovation, as it involves reproducing existing technological paths. Furthermore, Huawei’s products like mobile phones and foldable screens have generally average competitiveness in international markets, with lower overseas market share than Xiaomi. I highly doubt the R&D capabilities of such mega-enterprises that try to do “six-in-one, seven-in-one”.

李厚辰說得很有道理，這種創新模式其實可以叫做「戰術上勤奮，戰略上懶惰」。中國企業真的很擅長把 APP 優化到極致，每三天發一個小版本，每週一個大版本，用戶體驗好得不得了。比亞迪這些企業，也把大量功夫花在工藝優化上，產生了很多有意義的專利。但問題是，當你把大量功夫投入到戰術層面，很可能導致企業在戰略上出現問題。他們甚至忽略了整個政治風向的變化，整個市場總量的變化，卻敢於這樣盲目投資。這種「大公司病」並不只在中國有，歷史上的 Kodak 、 Nokia 都曾反覆出現。真正的突破性創新，往往由中小企業去顛覆原有的大企業生態。

Li Houchen’s point is very valid: this innovation model can be described as “tactically diligent, strategically lazy”. Chinese companies are truly adept at optimizing apps to the extreme, releasing small updates every three days and major updates every week, leading to excellent user experience. Companies like BYD also put a lot of effort into process optimization, generating many meaningful patents. But the problem is, when you invest so much effort into the tactical layer, it can easily lead to strategic issues for the company. They even ignore changes in the overall political climate and total market size, yet dare to invest so blindly. This “big company disease” isn’t unique to China; historical examples like Kodak and Nokia have repeatedly shown this problem. True disruptive innovation often comes from small and medium-sized enterprises disrupting the existing large enterprise ecosystem.

再來看「新三樣」的出口，雖然官方一直強調亮眼表現，但它在中國總出口額中的佔比非常小。以今年第一季度為例，新三樣出口總額達到 3431 億元，但也只佔所有出口總額的大概 5.5%。而且，比亞迪 2024 年的出口銷量還不到總銷量的 10%。所以，與這麼大的產能相比，出口量其實很小。

Let’s look at the exports of the “New Three Items.” While official sources constantly highlight impressive performance, their share of China’s total exports is very small. For example, in the first quarter of this year, the total export value of the New Three Items reached 343.1 billion RMB, but it only accounted for about 5.5% of all exports. Moreover, BYD’s export sales in 2024 were less than 10% of its total sales. Therefore, compared to its massive production capacity, the export volume is actually quite small.

更讓人擔憂的是，中國遭遇的困境是，在出口量不到 10% 的情況下，就已經遭到其他國家的貿易限制了。歐盟、巴西等國已經對中國的新能源汽車和光伏產品採取了高額的反傾銷和關稅措施。很多人說，其他國家也有補貼啊，這是他們雙標。但我認為，這還真不是。我們的補貼是從上游礦產，到中游生產，再到下游出口，從頭到尾沒有任何一個環節能放過。其他國家一般只補貼終端消費者。這種「從頭補到尾」的模式，在他們看來就是赤裸裸的傾銷，他們不可能放任我們去佔領他們的市場。

What’s even more concerning is that China’s predicament is that even with less than 10% of its total sales being exports, it’s already facing trade restrictions from other countries. The EU, Brazil, and other nations have implemented high anti-dumping duties and tariffs on China’s new energy vehicles and solar PV products. Many say that other countries also have subsidies, and this is just double standards. But I believe that’s truly not the case. Our subsidies cover the entire industry chain, from upstream mining to midstream production and downstream exports. Other countries generally only subsidize end consumers. This “start-to-finish” subsidy model is seen by them as blatant dumping, and they cannot allow us to dominate their markets.

最關鍵的是，這種出口模式對國家財政造成了嚴重的拖累。中國是有出口退稅的，新能源汽車更是全額退稅。有些地方政府甚至對出口型企業有「徵收即退」的制度，企業交了增值稅後，政府又退給他們。這意味著，你出口領域越亮眼，佔經濟比重越高，對國家稅收的拖累作用就越大。說白了，我們真的可以說是拿國家的財政在補貼外國市場。比亞迪過去五年從政府拿到的現金補貼是 860 億元，而它過去五年的淨利潤加起來是 940 億元。如果沒有政府補貼，這家公司幾乎不賺錢！這種模式不僅沒有向社會捐遞財富，反而是從財政中汲取財富。

Most critically, this export model has placed a severe burden on national finances. China offers export tax rebates, with new energy vehicles even enjoying full rebates. Some local governments even have a “collect and rebate” system for export-oriented enterprises, where taxes paid by companies are returned to them. This means that the more dazzling your export sector is, and the higher its proportion in the economy, the greater the drag on national tax revenue. Simply put, we are literally using national finances to subsidize foreign markets. BYD received 8.6 billion RMB in cash subsidies from the government over the past five years, while its net profit for the same period totaled 9.4 billion RMB. Without government subsidies, this company would barely be profitable! This model, far from distributing wealth to society, actually extracts wealth from public finances.

而且，「新三樣」除了新能源汽車，鋰電池和光伏的產業鏈都比較短，外溢效應不明顯。光伏整個產業鏈大概只帶動 400 萬左右的就業。就算新能源汽車產業鏈較長，整個新興能源領域加起來也就 3200 萬左右的就業，大約是房地產和基建加起來的三分之一。這意味著，中國如果光靠這些產業，不拉動第三產業和消費，是根本解決不了整體經濟問題的。更可怕的是，這些企業雖然規模龐大，卻「大而不富」。比如光伏，2024 年 64 家上市公司合計利潤負 297 億元，而 2023 年是盈利 1049 億元。去年光伏上市公司就裁員了 20 多萬人。這種發展方式，對於就業、資本市場和企業競爭力來說，都是有害的。

Furthermore, apart from new energy vehicles, the industrial chains for lithium batteries and solar photovoltaics are relatively short, with limited spillover effects. The entire solar PV industry chain only generates about 4 million jobs. Even though the new energy vehicle industrial chain is relatively long, the entire new energy sector combined only accounts for about 32 million jobs, which is roughly one-third of the employment generated by real estate and infrastructure combined. This means that if China relies solely on these industries without boosting the tertiary sector and consumption, it simply cannot solve the overall economic problems. What’s even more alarming is that while these companies are massive in scale, they are “big but not rich”. For example, in the solar PV sector, 64 listed companies collectively reported a loss of 29.7 billion RMB in 2024, compared to a profit of 104.9 billion RMB in 2023. Last year alone, solar PV listed companies laid off over 200,000 people. This development model is detrimental to employment, the capital market, and corporate competitiveness.

最後，我們不能不談 AI 對就業的衝擊。AI 在軟體開發、生物科技、軍事情報處理等領域確實能提升生產力，但它帶來的失業問題非常顯著。Anthropic 的 CEO 最近預測，未來五年一半的入門級白領工作崗位可能消失，失業率至少上升 20%。P&G（寶潔）公司已經宣布，要裁減全球 7000 個非製造業崗位，佔其非製造業崗位的 15%，理由是利用數字化和自動化（也就是 AI ）提高效率。你可以想像在中國，那些利潤更低、掙扎在生存邊緣的中小型企業，裁員的衝動和可能性只會比 P&G 劇烈得多。

Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of AI on employment. AI can indeed boost productivity in areas like software development, biotechnology, and military intelligence processing, but it also brings significant job displacement. The CEO of Anthropic recently predicted that half of entry-level white-collar jobs could disappear within the next five years, with unemployment rising by at least 20%. P&G (Procter & Gamble) has already announced plans to cut 7,000 non-manufacturing jobs globally, representing 15% of its non-manufacturing workforce, citing the use of digitalization and automation (i.e., AI) to improve efficiency. You can imagine that in China, small and medium-sized enterprises with even lower profit margins, struggling on the brink of survival, will have a much stronger impulse and likelihood to lay off workers than P&G.

如果以 P&G 為基準，非製造業白領有 15% 被取代，那將是數千萬人的規模。中國一年畢業生 1200 萬人，這意味著政府要再創造三倍的就業才能吸納這些人。但令人費解的是，習近平在今年四、五月份關於 AI 的重要報告中，從頭到尾沒有提 AI 可能對就業造成的影響。所有的官方宣傳都在強調 AI 帶來的「新機會」。雖然現在新畢業生找不到工作可以納入低保，但很多地方財政連公務員工資都發不出，這筆錢能落實多少是個大問題。這種「政治運動」式的推動 AI ，卻完全不顧其社會後果，實在讓人心寒。

If P&G is used as a benchmark, a 15% displacement of non-manufacturing white-collar workers would amount to tens of millions of people. China has 12 million university graduates annually, meaning the government would need to create three times that number of jobs to absorb them. What’s perplexing, however, is that Xi Jinping’s important report on AI in this year made no mention whatsoever of the potential impact of AI on employment10…. All official propaganda emphasizes the “new opportunities” brought by AI. While there’s a new policy allowing unemployed graduates to receive “dibao” (minimum living allowance), many local governments can’t even pay civil servants’ salaries, so how much of this money will actually be disbursed is a huge question. This “political campaign”-style promotion of AI, completely disregarding its social consequences, is truly disheartening.

中國領導層如此痴迷於「新質生產力」，在我看來，是他們最後孤注一擲解決經濟問題的方法。人民日報的解讀就說，這是「生產力的躍遷」，以「全要素生產率大幅提升為核心標誌」。這背後，是政府看明白了至少兩個問題：第一，中國不可能再靠政府或居民大幅借槓桿來拉動經濟了，債務已經高到頂點。第二，再靠基建也拉不動了，現在每創造 1% 的 GDP 需要 8 倍 GDP 的固定資產投資才能拉動，這將導致債務很快失控。

In my view, the Chinese leadership’s obsession with “new quality productive forces” is their last desperate attempt to solve current economic problems. The People’s Daily’s interpretation states that this is a “leap in productivity,” with “a significant increase in total factor productivity as its core indicator”. Behind this, the government has realized at least two issues: first, China can no longer rely on large-scale leveraging by the government or residents to stimulate the economy, as debt has almost peaked. Second, infrastructure can no longer drive growth; currently, every 1% of GDP growth requires 8 times that amount in fixed asset investment, which would quickly lead to out-of-control debt.

所以，當所有過去的路徑都走不通，而又不願進行政治和經濟體制改革、釋放市場活力的情況下，他們唯一的辦法就是寄希望於一種「魔法般的新技術」。他們希望在高技術的加持下，即便是在資源錯配的情況下，也能產生很好的經濟回報，填補經濟效率過低的問題，讓現有體制能夠延續下去。

So, with all traditional paths blocked and an unwillingness to undertake political and economic system reforms to unleash market vitality, their only option is to pin their hopes on a “magical new technology”. They hope that with the support of high technology, even in the context of resource misallocation, they can generate good economic returns, compensate for low economic efficiency, and thus perpetuate the existing system.

然而，對於普通人來說，我很不樂觀，不覺得我們能從這股熱潮中得到什麼。雖然可能會買到更便宜的新能源汽車，甚至「零公里二手車」，但就業機會的創造微乎其微，甚至會因為 AI 應用導致大量失業。至於像韓國總統承諾的「普遍基本收入」（ UBI ），在中國那是不可能的。習近平同志早就說過，「我們不養懶人」，中國一定是全世界倒數十個發 UBI 的國家之一。而且，中國現在的財政狀況，距離真的能從財政上發錢，那也是非常非常遙遠的事情。

However, for ordinary people, I am not optimistic; I don’t think we will gain much from this boom. While we might be able to buy cheaper new energy vehicles, or even “zero-kilometer used cars”, job creation will be minimal, and mass unemployment due to AI applications is even likely. As for a “Universal Basic Income” ( UBI ) as promised by the South Korean president, that’s impossible in China. Comrade Xi Jinping has long stated, “We don’t raise idlers,” and China will certainly be among the last ten countries in the world to implement UBI. Furthermore, given China’s current fiscal situation, the prospect of the government truly being able to distribute money is very, very distant.

所以，結論很明確：新三樣和 AI 救不了中國經濟。這不是說這些技術和領域本身不好，它們都非常有發展潛力，甚至對人類未來也很關鍵。但問題出在我們的「搞法」不對。我們這種從礦產到終端，全產業鏈補貼的方式，導致整個發展過程中價格信號和利潤信號都被扭曲了。在這種扭曲之下，它既阻礙了這些企業在國際市場上的公平競爭（因為對其他國家來說完全不公平），也阻礙了在國內進行健康的競爭。它完全以價格戰的方式推進，這種方式對財政不好，對企業本身的利潤不好，對企業的未來發展也不好。

Therefore, the conclusion is clear: the New Three Items and AI cannot save the Chinese economy. This is not to say that these technologies and sectors themselves are bad; they all have great development potential and are even critical for humanity’s future. But the problem lies in our “approach” being wrong. Our method of subsidizing the entire industry chain, from raw materials to end products, has distorted both price and profit signals throughout the development process. Under this distortion, it hinders these companies from competing fairly in the international market (because it’s completely unfair to other countries) and also impedes healthy competition domestically. It pushes development solely through price wars, an approach that is detrimental to public finances, to the companies’ own profits, and to their future development.

回頭看，當初搞「供給側結構性改革」，目標是「積極穩妥去產能過剩」，結果搞了十年，產能過剩比以前更厲害。那時的目標還有「防範化解金融風險」，看看現在的債務風險。還有「化解房地產庫存」，結果 2016 年開始「棚改貨幣化」，到現在房地產庫存又創歷史新高。

Looking back, when we initiated “supply-side structural reform,” one of the goals was “actively and prudently reducing overcapacity.” Yet, after ten years, overcapacity is worse than ever. Other goals included “preventing and resolving financial risks,” and now look at the current debt risks. There was also “resolving real estate inventory,” but then “shantytown renovation monetization” began in 2016, and now real estate inventory has reached a historic high.

這就說明，庫存多、產能過剩、甚至產生金融風險，是內生於中國政治和經濟制度裡的。它就像點石成金之手，一摸哪個領域，那個領域就產能過剩、無限增值。新三樣和 AI 這些領域，原本是好的，但在中國這個制度下，反而被搞得一團糟，不僅沒有解決中國的問題，甚至在惡化問題。

This demonstrates that excess inventory, overcapacity, and even the generation of financial risks are inherent to China’s political and economic system. It’s like the Midas touch; whatever sector it touches, that sector becomes plagued by overcapacity and infinite growth. The New Three Items and AI sectors, which are inherently good, have been thrown into disarray under our system, not only failing to solve China’s problems but even exacerbating them.